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Abstract
We present critical arguments against individual interpretation of
Bohr’s complementarity and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principles. Sta-
tistical interpretation of these principles is discussed in the contextual
framework. We support the possibility to use Statistical Contextual
Realist Interpretation of quantum formalism. In spite of all no-go
theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell,...), re-
cently (quant-ph/0306003 and 0306069) we constructed a realist basis
of quantum mechanics. In our model both classical and quantum
spaces are rough images of the fundamental prespace. Quantum me-
chanics cannot be reduced to classical one. Both classical and quan-
tum representations induce reductions of prespace information.
”Often we enter the unknown edifice of a new scientific
discipline through a lesser gate that leads us into a side
passage. It may take us a long while to find our way




In this paper we present some critical arguments against individual under-
standing of Bohr’s complementarity and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principles.
It is argued the only possible interpretation of these principles is the statis-
tical contextual one. In particular, in the opposite to orthodox Copenhagen
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views such interpretation does not imply the impossibility to assign to ele-
mentary particles1 objective properties; including position and momentum.
Of course, such ontic description of physical reality might not be provided by
quantum formalism. In particular, it is clear that quantum formalism does
not provide the complete description of physical reality.
We argue that the most natural interpretation of physical theories (in
particular, quantum formalism) is Statistical Contextual Realist Interpreta-
tion.
2 Contextual statistical realist interpretation
of physical theories
Quantum theory as well as classical physics is used to describe properties of
pairs
pi = (physical system,measuring device). (1)
I do not think that understanding of this fact, contextual structure of phys-
ical theories, really was Bohr’s invention. It was clear to everybody that
physical observables are related to properties of physical systems as well
as measuring devices. The main invention of N. Bohr was not contextual-
ity, but complementarity. Bohr’s greatest contribution was the recognition
of the fact that there exist complementary experimental arrangements and
hence complementary, incompatible, pairs pi1, pi2 of form (1). I think nobody
can be against the recognition of such a possibility. Why not? Why must
all contexts, complexes of physical conditions, be coexisting? Contextual-
ity and complementarity are two well understandable principles (not only of
quantum physics, but physics in general).
The real problem was that N. Bohr as well as W. Heisenberg (but merely
further generations of their adherents) did not pay attention that quantum
complementarity is the experimental fact concerning pairs
pi = (elementary particle,macroscopic measuring device) (2)
and not elementary particles by their self. It is a pity that the greatest
promoters of contextualism forgot about contextual basis of complementarity.
If we remember about contextuality discussing complementarity we see
that complementarity of contexts in quantum physics does not imply com-
plementarity of corresponding objective properties (of elementary particles)
1The reader may protest against the use of the notion ‘particle’. It might be better
to use e.g. ‘quantum system.’ But I dislike to use ‘quantum’ regarding to real physi-
cal objects. ‘Quantum’ has become merely the symbol of a rather special mathematical
formalism.
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contributing into such observables. In particular, contextual complementar-
ity does not imply that elementary particles do not have objective properties
at all. In particular, there are no reasons to suppose that it is impossible
to provide a kind of hidden variable, HV, description (ontic description, see
e.g. [1]) for these objective properties. Mathematically the pair pi can be de-
scribed by two variables λs and λd representing objective states of a physical
system and measuring device. So a physical observable is represented as a
function
A = A(λs;λd). (3)
In general, λs can be represented as a vector with numerical coordinates.
Numerical does not mean ‘real number’. It can be as well e.g. p-adic num-
ber, see [2]. So the possibility of HV-description does not imply continuous
infinitely divisible representation of physical reality. In principle, classical
physical description is often identified with the description based on the
real-number ‘continuous’ model. We would not like to use such a restrictive,
XVIIIth, XIXth century and the first half of XXth century, interpretation
of classical physics. A classical physical model is every model that provides
objective description of phenomena – representation of physical observables
in form (3). I think that mixing of ‘classical’ and ‘continuous’ was one of
main roots of vague interpreting of results of experiments with elementary
particles. Thus the development of alternative (nonreal, noncontinuous) clas-
sical models, e.g. p-adic [3], [4], might play important role in clarification of
foundations of quantum theory.
On the other hand, an adherent of N. Bohr would argue that ”Such a
separation and, hence, the description of (properties of) quantum objects and
processes themselves (as opposed to certain effects of their interaction with
measuring instruments upon latter) are impossible in Bohr’s interpretation,”
[5].
I think that the origin of such an interpretation of complementarity by N.





Close relation between Bohr’s complementarity principle and Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle is well know. For two years (1926-1927) N. Bohr could
not present any model that could explain both corpuscular behaviour (black
body radiation, photoelectric effect) and wavelike behaviour (two slit exper-
iment, diffraction) of elementary particles. You can read e.g. in the book
[6] how heavy this thinking process was for N. Bohr - really a kind of men-
tal disaster. Only after the derivation by W. Heisenberg of the uncertainty
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principle, N. Bohr proposed a new model of physical reality based on the
principle of complementarity. Unfortunately, Heisenberg’s uncertainty rela-
tion was interpreted as the relation for an individual elementary particle.
The main problem was mixing by W. Heisenberg of individual and statistical
uncertainty. For example, in his famous book [7] he discussed the uncertainty
principle as a relation for an individual system, but derived this principle by
using statistical methods!
The roots of such individual complementarity can be found already in the
first work of W. Heisenberg [8]. At the beginning Heisenberg’s quantization
procedure was not statistical one. It seems, see [8], that W. Heisenberg was
sure that he found equations for observables related to individual physical
systems. It was a rather common point view: in classical mechanics the po-
sition and momentum of an individual (!) system are described by real num-
bers, in quantum mechanics – by matrices. W. Heisenberg rightly underlined
that matrice-description could not be used for describing objective position
and momentum of electron. There (as everywhere in XVIIIth – XXth cen-
turies physics) objective reality was, in fact, identified with the continuous
(real number) mathematical model of physical reality. Impossibility to create
a continuous real number model for motion of electron in Bohr’s model of
atom was considered by Heisenberg (and many others) as impossibility to
assign objective properties to electrons. It was a rather strange passage. But
we understand that it was the beginning of XXth century and W. Heisen-
berg used the standard mathematical image of physical reality. However, we
would like to remark that even at that time there were attempts to mod-
ify continuous mathematical model to reproduce quantum effects, see e.g.
Bohr, Kramers, Slater [9] on classical-like quantization based on difference
equations (instead of differential). In fact, this model stimulated M. Born to
introduce the term quantum mechanics. In any case the absence of contin-
uous classical model for motion of electron in Bohr’s atom does not imply
impossibility to create other, noncontinuous, classical (causal deterministic)
models. Moreover, considerations of W. Heisenberg in [8] even did not imply
impossibility to create continuous classical model – as it was claimed by W.
Heisenberg and then by N. Bohr. The story is much simpler: first Bohr tried
to create such a thing, but could not; then Heisenberg, with the same result.
After this it was claimed that such a model did not exist. And what is the
most interesting: not only for Bohr’s model of atom (well it might be), but
for any other model... I cannot understand this kind of ‘quantum logic’.
Really W. Heisenberg proposed some mathematical model for some class
of observations of position and momentum of electron. These observations
satisfy to the uncertainty relation. It is not clear why we cannot present
other mathematical models for some other observations of position and mo-
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mentum of electron that would violate this relation? Of course, if we relate
Heisenberg’s position and momentum to individual electron, then such indi-
vidualization plays the role of objectification of these quantities. It is rather
strange logical circle, but it seems that it was done by W. Heisenberg and N.
Bohr. Finally, this objectification in combination with the uncertainty rela-
tion implies (for W. Heisenberg and N. Bohr) impossibility to consider other
position and momentum variables, distinct from Heisenberg’s ones. On the
other hand, if we use statistical interpretation of uncertainty relation, then
there are no reasons for such NO-GO conclusions. Well, we could not prepare
statistical ensembles with small dispersions for two variables introduced by
W. Heisenberg. But we should have great imagination to make Heisenberg-
Bohr conclusions.
Unfortunately, many clear mind scientists used and still use Heisenberg-
Bohr’s ‘quantum logic’. For instance, the fundamental paper of A. Zeilinger
[] gives us an excelent example of the modern representation of this logic. In
principle, A. Zeilinger is looking for a new quantum paradigm. He correctly
underlines that the situation in quantum theory, especially large diversity of
interpretations, is not so natural. That in the opposite to e.g. theory of rel-
ativity, there is no quantum analogue of the principle of relativity. However,
it seems that, for Zeilinger as well as for many other scientists looking for
reconsideration of quantum foundations, such a reconsideration could (and
moreover should) be performed as some addition to the orthodox Copen-
hagen. A. Zeilinger started (as always in this story) with the correct state-
ment that we are dealing with a quantum phenomenon as the whole entity
which comprises both the observed quantum system and the classical measur-
ing apparata. No doubts! The formalism of quantum mechanics (statistical
formalism) deals with such a phenomenon. However, then he continued: It is
especially impossible in principle to predict with certainty both through which
slit an elementary particle will go and where it will appear in the interference
pattern. Well, we still can interpret this statement in the correct way: quan-
tum formalism does not give us such a possibility. Unfortunately, the latter
understanding was impossible to orthdox Copenhagen, since (by unclear rea-
sons) it was supposed quantum theory provided the complete description of
physical reality.2 So, Zeilinger continued: I propose that this impossibility
to describe the random individual process within quantum mechanics in a
complete way is a fundamental limitation of the program of modern science
to arrive at a description of the world in every detail. This is the great
2I think that the paper of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, Can quantum mechanical
description of physical reality be considered complete?, [], was directed precisely against
Heisenberg-Bohr ‘quantum logic’ that was, in fact, based on the idea that quantum theory
is complete.
5
manifistation of Copenhagen NO-GO.
Another important story that stimulated Bohr’s complementarity think-
ing was Shro¨dinger’s quantum story. It is important to recall that E. Shro¨dinger
was sure that he discovered totally new method of quantization [10], ”Quan-
tization as the problem for eigenvalues.” In his first paper [10] he did not refer
to Heisenberg’s paper [8]; in the second paper [11] he made a short reference
in the sense that W. Heisenberg proposed some other method of quantization
that was totally different from Shro¨dinger’s one. It is well known that many
famous physicists had the great prejudice against Heisenberg’s approach to
quantization. So Shro¨dinger’s wave mechanics was considered by many of
them as the end of quantum mechanics; as the possibility to describe ‘quan-
tum experiments’ by using classical theory of partial differential equations
(especially strong anti Heisenberg-Bohr comments were done by Einstein and
Wien).
Hence, Heisenberg and Bohr must find some strong arguments in favour of
Heisenberg approach or disappear from quantum scene. Moreover, the whole
quantum spectacle could be ended with quite trivial final: instead great
mystery — simply a part of well established theory of partial differential
equations. If all those circumstances be taken into account, it would be
clear how N. Bohr created complementarity principle with all its NO-GO
consequences.
So Bohr’s complementarity was a kind of individual complementarity.
Complementary features were regarded to individual physical systems. It is
a pity that contextualists N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg related the uncertainty
relation not to some special class of measurement procedures of the position
and momentum described by quantum formalism, but to the position and
momentum of an individual elementary particle. This imply the prejudice
that the position and momentum even in principle could not be determined
simultaneously and, moreover, that it is even in principle impossible to as-
sign such a physical property, e.g. position or momentum, to e.g. electron:
”electron does not have trajectory.”
In fact, the only possible conscious interpretation of Heisenberg’s un-
certainty principle is the statistical contextual interpretation, see e.g. [12],
[13]. It is impossible to prepare such an ensemble of elementary particles
that dispersions of both position and momentum observables would be arbi-
trary small. Everybody would agree that only this statement can be verified
experimentally. Contextualism has to be statistical contextualism and, con-
sequently, complementarity has to be statistical contextual complementarity.
Such contextualism and complementarity do not contradict to the possibility
of finer description of reality than given by quantum theory.
The complex of experimental physical conditions must be split into two
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complexes – a preparation procedure and a measurement procedure, see e.g.
[14], [15]. A preparation procedure produces a statistical ensemble of physical
system. Then a measurement device produces results – values of a physical
observable. Nonzero dispersion of this random variable does not imply that
individual physical system does not have objective properties that produce
values of the observable via (3). Thus contextual statistical interpretation
can be, in principle, extended to contextual statistical realist interpretation.
Of course, individual complementarity can be used as an argument against
the possibility to create finer description of physical reality than given by
quantum mechanics. But statistical complementarity cannot be used as such
an argument. By contextual statistical interpretation it is not forbidden in
principle to create such preparation and measurement procedures that posi-
tion and momentum would be measured with dispersions ∆q and ∆p such
that ∆q∆p < h
2
. Of course, such a statement should immediately induce a
storm of protests with reference to the principle of complementarity. How-
ever, we again recall that the right complementarity principle is contextual
and statistical. It is about some class of measurement and preparation con-
texts described by quantum formalism. In particular, we do not consider
quantum formalism as a kind of complete physical theory.
However, as far as we cannot perform such experiments for elementary
particles, it is really impossible to reject Bohr’s principle of individual com-
plementarity. 3 What can we do?
We can study consequences of the general statistical contextuality and try
to demonstrate that some distinguishing features of quantum theory that
are typically associated with individual complementarity, NO-GO comple-
mentarity, are, in fact, simple consequences of statistical complementarity,
GO-DEEPER complementarity. I did this in a series of papers, see e.g. [16],
[17]. The main consequence of these investigations is that ‘waves of probabil-
ity’ can be produced in the general situation (including macroscopic systems)
due to combination of a few preparation contexts.4 Thus such ‘waves’ are not
directly related to some wave features of objects participating in an experi-
ments. Moreover, our investigation demonstrated that in some experiments
there can be created other types of probabilistic waves, namely hyperbolic
waves of probability.
In particular, our contextual probabilistic investigations demonstrated
that contextual complementarity, wave-particle dualism, is not rigidly cou-
3Well, we may produce various realistic models underlying quantum formalism, for
example, Bohmian mechanics, stochastic electrodynamics. However, it seems that all such
models would be more or less automatically rejected by quantum community.
4In the two slit experiment we consider the screen with slits as a part of an ensemble-
preparation device and the screen with photoemulsion as a measurement device.
7
pled to microworld. Thus we can, in principle, perform experiments with
macro systems that would demonstrate ‘wave-particle duality’, but not of
macro objects, but contexts.
Such a numerical experiment, a classical analogue of the well known quan-
tum two-slit experiment, was performed in [18]. Charged particles are scat-
tered on flat screen with two slits and hit the second screen. We show that
the probability distribution on the second screen when both slits are open
is not given by the sum of distributions for each slit separately, but has an
extra interference term that is given with the quantum rule of the addition
of probabilistic alternatives. We have two theoretical descriptions of this
experiment: 1) quantum-like statistical description; 2) Newtonian classical
description. Both theories give the same statistical distribution of spots on
the registration screen. Quantum-like theory operates with complex waves
of probability; there is uncertainty, Heisenberg-like, relation for position and
momentum. Of course, this relation is the statistical one.
Suppose now that some observer could not provide the verification of
Newtonian description, e.g. such an observer is a star-size observer and its
measuring device produces nonnegligible perturbations of our macroscopic
charged balls. Such an observer might speculate on impossibility to find ob-
jective phase-space description and even about waves features of macroscopic
balls. This experiment might be used as (at least indirect) argument against
the orthodox Copenhagen NO-GO in experiments.
We recognize that at the moment there is one (and seems just one) ar-
gument supporting individual complementarity, namely Bell’s inequality.5
However, I have great doubts that the experimental violation of Bell’s in-
equality can be interpreted as an argument against the possibility of HV
ontic description (or even against realism) or locality, see e.g. my works
[19],[20] (see also papers of L.Accardi, L. Ballentine, W. De Myunck in [21];
see also [22] on contextual statistical realist interpretation of GHZ-paradox.
Finally, we remark that the possibility of (3)–description implies that
‘quantum randomness’ does not differ essentially from ‘classical randomness’
Of course, this contradict to orthodox quantum views to randomness as fun-
damental or irreducible randomness. Unfortunately, I could not understand
the latter ideas. Instead of fundamental irreducible quantum randomness, I
prefer to consider well understandable theory of context (complex of experi-
mental physical conditions) depending probabilities.
A new fundamental principle that we propose can be called:
The principle of contextual relativity of probabilities.
Contextuality means that all probabilities depend on complexes of phys-
5Some people use this framework to support quantum nonlocality.
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ical conditions, S, – contexts: P(E) ≡ PS(E). It is meaningless to speak
about probability without to determine complex of physical conditions. This
is clear idea looks even trivial after it has been formulated. However, we re-
mark that the conventional probability theory based on Kolmogorov measure
theoretical axiomatics, 1933, [], is not contextual. In Kolmogorov’s theory
the probability space can be fixed once for ever. We need not remember that
probabilities depend on complexes of physical conditons and can use just the
symbol of abstract probability P.
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3 Citation with comments
In this section we shall present some citations on orthodox quantum theory
and our contextual statistical realist comments. We use, in particular, col-
lections of Bohr’s views presented in papers of H. Folse and A. Plotnitsky,
see [23], [5].
(S1)”In contrast to ordinary mechanics, the new quantum mechanics does
not deal with a space-time description of the motion of atomic particles. It
operates with manifolds of quantities which replace the harmonic oscillating
components of the motion and symbolize the possibilities of transition be-
tween stationary states in conformity with the correspondence principle”, N.
Bohr.
This is simply the recognition of the restrictiveness of the domain of ap-
plications of quantum theory. I would like to interpret this as the recognition
of incompleteness of quantum theory. However, it was not so for N. Bohr:
(S2) ” ... the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic
phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not be
neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense
can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation,”
N. Bohr.
The first part of this citation is the manifestation of contextuality. How-
ever, I cannot understand what kind of logic N. Bohr used to proceed to the
6We remark that A. Kolmogorov by himself understood well contextual dependence of
probabilities, see section 2 on experimental applications of his theory in []. However, this
contextuality was not present in his mathematical formalism. It was the terrible mistake
of Kolmogorov. In fact, he tried to improve the situation and published paper [] in that
he noticed that probabilities are contextual probabilities and even used corresponding
symbol. However, the paper was published only in Russian and even in Soviet Union it
was forgotten. Recently the pupil of Kolmogorov, A. Shiryaev, paid my attention to this
paper.
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second part. The second part can be interpreted as the declaration of the
impossibility of objective, ontic description of reality.
(S3) ”... to reserve the word phenomenon for comprehension of effects
observed under given experimental conditions... These conditions, which in-
clude the account of the properties and manipulation of all measuring instru-
ments essentially concerned, constitute in fact the only basis for the definition
of the concepts by which the phenomenon is described,” N. Bohr.
I would agree if the last sentence would be continued as ”is described in
quantum formalism.”
(S4) ”...by the very nature of the situation prevented from differentiat-
ing sharply between an independent behaviour of atomic objects and their
interaction with the means of observation indispensable for the definition of
the phenomena,” N. Bohr.
I would agree if the last sentence would be continued as ”of the phenomena
described by quantum formalism.”
(S5) ”There are two forms in which quantum mechanics may be expressed,
based on Heisenberg’s matrices and Schro¨dinger’s wave function respectively.
The second of these is not connected directly with classical mechanics. The
first is in close analogy with classical mechanics, as it may be obtained from
classical mechanics simply by making the variables of classical mechanics
into non-commuting quantities satisfying the correct commutation relations.”
P.Dirac, [24].
No Comment...
4 On romantic interpretation of quantumme-
chanics
Finally, we ask: ”Why the realistic interpretation is not so popular in quan-
tum community?”
The common opinion: this is the direct consequence of experiments with
elementary particles. Well, I do not think so. Of course, interference exper-
iments with massive particles should induce reconsideration of methods of
classical statistical mechanics. As well as discreteness of energy levels should
induce reconsideration of classical continuous real model of physics. However,
such reconsiderations would be merely mathematical. And it seems (at least
for me) that they were merely mathematical. Observables take only discrete
values – consider ‘discrete’ number systems instead of ‘continuous’. The stan-
dard probability calculus (created for one fixed sample space prepared under
stable physical conditions) does not work – create the new one. And this was
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done and very successfully. However, there were no reasons to create new
quantum philosophy, based on Bohr’s principle of complementarity and the
individual interpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations. Nevertheless,
such a new philosophy was invented (merely by N. Bohr) and, moreover,
it was recognized as philosophy of modern physics. Since this recognition,
all realistic models for experiments with elementary particles were more or
less automatically rejected, see e.g. A. Lande’s statistical contextual real-
istic model for diffraction [25]. Lande’s model looks quite natural; here we
need not apply to wave-particle dualism, collapse and so on... It was simply
rejected. Bohmian mechanics, see e.g. [26], – well, it has its disadvantages,
but merely, mathematical.
Finally, Bell’s inequality arguments were interpreted as they should be
interpreted in the orthodox quantum framework, despite very strong counter-
arguments. If all these counter-arguments be taken into account, Bell’s in-
equality activity would look very strange, as a kind of mystification.
I suspect that the main reason for this rather strange situation in mod-
ern physics is the great attraction of romantic spirit of orthodox quantum
philosophy. All these nonreal things, wave-particle dualism, collapse, nonlo-
cality, irreducible randomness, were attractive for some of creators as well as
further quantum generations. These are different stories to discuss merely
mathematical modification of real-continuous model of classical statistical
mechanics or to declare scientific revolution. So orthodox Copenhagen inter-
pretation was a kind of romantic stage in the development of physics. It is
always not easy argue against romanticism. Probably we need not do this.
I hope that realism (as the history of literature shows us) would (sooner or
later) come to physics.
I would like to thank J. Bub, P. Lahti, W. De Baere, A. Plotnitsky and I.
Pitowsky for extended discussions on the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. Despite their critisism, these discussions were very important for me;
in particular, to understand better Copenhagen Interpretation (or it would
be better to say Copenhagen Interpretations) of quantum mechanics. Espe-
cially important role played discussions with A. Plotnitsky including deep
analysis of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s views. I would like to thank him for his
long ‘private lectures’ on Bohr’s complementarity. On the other hand, it is
important to underline that my views presented in this paper strongly differ
from his views (that are presented e.g. in [5]).
We underline that our analysis of views of N. Bohr and H. Heisenberg
demonstrated that by using the statistical interpretation of the principle
of complementarity and uncertainty relations we escape the contradiction
between the quantum formalism and realism. Statistical approach to Bohr’s
contextualism does not contradict to the possibility to construct a realist
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prequantum model. And recently I, finally, constructed such a model (in spite
of all no-go theorems – e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell,...),
see [27]. In our model both classical and quantum spaces are rough images
of the fundamental prespace. Quantum mechanics cannot be reduced to
classical one. But the realist prespace model (inducing both classical and
quantum representations of reality) can be constructed. In such a model
both classical and quantum representations induce reductions of prespace
information.
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